[HacktionLab] technology and trade EU-US

Michael Reinsborough m.reinsborough at qub.ac.uk
Wed Dec 3 13:53:59 UTC 2025


This is almost off topic to send trade to a hacktion list but actually, a lot is about tech trade and (lack of) regulation.

Quite a lot going on around trade just now  and big shift in how trade is happening (see report below) less formal agreements subverting legislative processes with technocractic. Also the UK signed a 'technology partnership<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/us-uk-pact-will-boost-advances-in-drug-discovery-create-tens-of-thousands-of-jobs-and-transform-lives>' agreement with the US.  Keir Starmer stopped all the work the competition's watchdog was doing by putting Amazon chief in charge https://www.thecanary.co/uk/analysis/2025/02/07/amazon-doug-gurr-labour/

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REPORT (taken from EU-US trade campaigning group)
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In the EU a joint statement on a framework agreement<https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-united-states-european-union-framework-agreement-reciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade-2025-08-21_en> was signed with the US, August 2025
In the UK an Economic Prosperity Deal<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/681d327d43d6699b3c1d2a9d/US_UK_EPD_050825_FINAL_rev_v2.pdf> was signed with the US in May 2025, updated in June 2025<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6855877f76eec44bf9d71dab/update-on-uk-us-economic-prosperity-deal.pdf>, and followed by a 'technology partnership<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/us-uk-pact-will-boost-advances-in-drug-discovery-create-tens-of-thousands-of-jobs-and-transform-lives>' in September accompanied by a package of private investment deals<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/record-breaking-150bn-investment-unveiled-during-us-state-visit>, primarily digital
In Switzerland and Liechtenstein a joint statement on a framework agreement<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/11/joint-statement-on-a-framework-for-a-united-states-switzerland-liechtenstein-agreement-on-fair-balanced-and-reciprocal-trade/> was signed with the US in Nov 2025.
Implementation and impact
The EU-US framework agreement and the other US agreements are short and in legal terms non-binding. They don't look like the trade agreements that we are used to, and the way in which they have an impact is likely to also be different.
The EU-US framework agreement itself will not go through any of the formal EU processes that an FTA would, because it is 'just' a joint statement. It does not require the agreement of Council and Parliament.
However the first element of the statement is the EU's commitment to eliminate tariffs. There are formal processes required within the EU to change tariffs, so that commitment is going through a formal legislative process, and that will make that element legally binding.
Other elements of the statement, like weakening climate regulations or buying LNG have soft wording. However the threat of more tariff hikes, or removal of support for Ukraine, have become a Damocles sword hanging over the EU's head. If Trump thinks the EU is not following through on its commitments, he is unlikely to be convinced by a weaselly argument that the commitment was only to 'cooperate on'. He will just reintroduce the threat, and having given in once already, is the EU actually going to stand up to him the next time? Plus some in the EU want to do these things anyway. These commitments may turn out to be effectively binding in reality.
It's not primarily lawyers arguing over clauses that will make these agreements enforceable; it's threats.
The ways in which implementation and impact play out could include:

  1.  Formal implementation in legislation
The EU has put forward legislation<https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/en/procedure-file?reference=2025/0261(COD)> to implement the commitment to eliminate tariffs on industrial goods and lower them/introduce quotes on many agricultural goods.
This is going through parliament at present, and providing the structure of a process that we are familiar with. There is opposition in the European Parliament, including from Lange who is the rapporteur, and there is the possibility that the Parliament will not pass the proposal as it stands but instead make significant changes.
However the actual subject of the parliamentary process is quite limited, and clearly much of the concern and opposition is about wider issues, which are being squeezed into the narrow process.
We also should not let the fact that there is a familiar, visible process here overshadow the other things going on in parallel.
2.                       US demands to take the soft wording literally
In various ways the US and corporate groups are taking the soft wording of other parts of the framework deal literally and demanding that the EU get on with implementing them:

  *   Shortly after the framework deal was signed, the US Energy Secretary was reported<https://www.euractiv.com/news/how-an-ex-fracking-ceo-crashed-europes-independence-moment/> to be telling everyone on a tour to Brussels that the EU's sustainability due diligence regulations (CSDDD), sustainability targets (CSRD) and limits on dirty gas (methane regulations) need to be changed
  *   Politico Brussels Playbook reported the Trump administration had followed up the joint statement with a proposal that included exempting the US from EU green and tech rules
  *   US Energy Secretary wrote an open letter<https://www.energy.gov/articles/us-energy-secretary-and-qatari-energy-minister-send-letter-eu-regarding-proposed-corporate> calling for the EU to either repeal or water down CSDDD
  *   US business groups have written<https://www.uschamber.com/finance/joint-trade-letter-on-eu-corporate-sustainability-due-diligence-directive> to the US government saying that the EU committed in the framework agreement to "undertake efforts to ensure that the CSDDD and the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) do not pose undue restrictions on transatlantic trade" and asking for action
The EU can say no - that nothing in the joint framework was binding. But that requires the political will to actually say no, even when Trump decides he is tired of waiting and starts issuing more threats. Bringing us to...
3.                       Straightforward threats
Having succeeded in getting the EU to agree to the framework deal and tariff elimination to avert Trump's tariff threats and other threats, the Trump administration can continue to make threats on the next things that it wants. The bully comes back for more.
For instance the EU is reported<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/nov/07/european-commission-ai-artificial-intelligence-act-trump-administration-tech-business> to be considering delaying introducing regulation of AI and big tech more generally, as a result of threats.
4.                       Follow up deals
The experience of the UK was that the initial deal was followed up (so far) by a digital deal. The deal itself was again non-binding, but under its coattails a whole series of private investment deals<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/record-breaking-150bn-investment-unveiled-during-us-state-visit> were done, mainly on digital but also on other issues. Those private deals were legal contracts. We don't know what was in them, but the suspicion is that they will have included many of the provisions that we might fear from a trade deal.
The UK digital deal, as a thing that was definitely happening as opposed to a rumour, happened within an extremely short time frame of weeks.
It seems quite probable that everywhere that signs a framework agreement will come under pressure and threats to sign follow up deals and there may be little warning of the specific ones that are coming.
The EU framework agreement, like most of the others, anticipates that eventually it will lead to an Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade. This may well simply be done piece by piece, drip by drip, rather than there ever being a concerted set of negotiations with a mandate. Many of these pieces will individually be small enough to evade democratic processes.
5.                       Integration with internal deregulatory push
The pressure from the US can dovetail with internal deregulatory pressure from the right which the EU is simultaneously facing - the Omnibus law and wider deregulatory push<https://corporateeurope.org/en/deregulation-watch>.
This can also give plausible deniability - that the due diligence requirements are being watered down entirely coincidentally and not as a result of the trade threats.
6.                       Divide and rule
The Commission justifies the framework agreement as being at least better than other countries have got. Rather than countries acting in solidarity in the face of Trump's threats, governments are scrabbling to get a slightly better deal than the next country.
The US is also using these deals to tie countries into supporting it on China, on digital, on raw materials, etc.
How can we campaign
We had several discussions at the conference in September about how profoundly the trade system is changing<https://europeantradejustice.org/25-years/>, and what we can do<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1f76CR7uJjqgYu4V8K8PSCG-ZkHJY23QS4pCKvnBmpMU/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.yr05q3se0fzc>.
We know that in our campaigning we do better with a process to focus around. However it is apparent that the legislative process in the European Parliament is only one element of what is happening. It is also likely that individual elements of the overall trade interactions may come and go quite quickly, without time to build up mobilisation on each bit specifically.
Proposed parameters

  *   Treat the 'process' that we are campaigning on as all of the aspects above<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1c-walkaZi2LJJ_LomuEq_loZmsIZhNake9ZcJsyVcd0/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.120b18s1jyvm>
  *   Emphasise the issues at stake, as the unifying threads, and mobilise around these so that we are already ready for short notice processes
  *   We need to be able to talk about positive alternatives because otherwise the alternative to Trump is doubling down on the neoliberal status quo
  *   We need to campaign in solidarity with all the other trade deals the Trump administration is doing, to avoid the divide and rule
Possible framings
Issues we could frame campaigning around could be;

  *   Digital
  *   Energy / LNG
  *   Link to the deregulation campaign
  *   Militarism
  *   Stand up to bullying
  *   Anti-fascism
Ways of framing could be:

  *   All the issues
Emphasise that the trade deal could impact all of the issues above (and more) - a TTIP 2:0, where the deal is the scary thing because it contains many issues
  *   One or two lead issues
For instance as in this WeMove petition<https://action.wemove.eu/sign/2025-10-trump-trade-deal-petition-EN/> which majors on climate/energy and digital
Questions
Campaigning 'against Trump' or 'in times of Trump'?

  *   'against Trump' examples:

     *   TTIP 2.0
     *   global 'no deals with Trump' campaign - pro: a way for people around the world who aren't in the US, don't have a vote etc to resist; con: is it too late now (this was what we were saying in May)
     *   who is profiting from Trump's actions (Big Tech CEOs, LNG etc) as key line of attack

  *   'in times of Trump' examples

     *   centre one of the key issues, eg digital, energy, and build a wider campaign with 'and how does trade affect this' as just one of the aspects (eg People vs Big Tech<https://peoplevsbig.tech/standupursula/> - 'Stand up Ursula: fight for Europe not for Trump and Big Tech')
     *   can we have a new new international economic order - built out of the rubble of the old neoliberal certainties collapsing
Can we still draw on the hypocrisy/mismatch between positive aims in other areas of policy and trade policy, when trade policy has become so blatantly, openly about domination?
How do we resist the executive/dictatorial approach - if there are no democratic processes, no votes, no points where consent is needed? What can we learn from others who have faced this?
Looking beyond Trump: the global justice movement has defined (neoliberal) trade as a pillar to a global capitalist economy. Should attacking pillars of power within global capitalism become more of a focus for us again? Where are the main pathways for global capitalism being set (which were now FTAs for a long time)? How do these still link to trade?
How do we think about other global movements active at the moment and how does the trade topic link to those?

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