[ssf] epicurean feasts fit for kings is Re: [sheffield-anti-war-coalition] Re: no..2 . Prominent Jews call for open debate on Israel

[adam bashid]

hi,

http://www.centredaily.com/128/story/12584.html

''why'' -- t. chapman


III. Plutarch, that Epicurus Actually Makes A Pleasant Life Impossible
======================================================================

It goes without saying that very little of this treatise by Plutarch is 
of any use. One need only read the introduction with its clumsy 
boastfulness and its crude interpretation of the Epicurean philosophy in 
order no longer to entertain any doubt about Plutarch's utter 
incompetence in philosophical criticism.

Although he may agree with the view of Metrodorus:

"They [the Epicureans] believe that the supreme good is found in the 
belly and all other passages of the flesh through which pleasure and 
non-pain make their entrance, and that all the notable and brilliant 
inventions of civilisation were devised for this belly-centred pleasure 
and for the good expectation of this pleasure [.... ]" p. 1087, this is 
minime [least of all] Epicurus' teaching. Even Sextus Empiricus sees the 
difference between Epicurus and the Cyrenaic school in that he asserts 
that voluptas [pleasure] is voluptas animi. [pleasure of the soul]

"Epicurus asserts that in illness the sage often actually laughs at the 
paroxysms of the ''disease''. Then how can men for whom the pains of the 
body are so slight and easy to bear find anything appreciable in its 
pleasures?" p. 1088.

It is clear that Plutarch does not understand Epicurus' consistency. For 
Epicurus the highest pleasure is freedom from pain, from diversity, the 
absence of any dependence; the body which depends on no other for its 
sensation, which does not feel this diversity, is healthy, positive. 
This position, which achieves its highest form in Epicurus' otiose god, 
is of itself like a chronic sickness in which the ''disease'', because 
of its duration, ceases to be a condition, becomes, as it were, 
''familiar'' and ''normal''. We have seen in Epicurus' philosophy of 
nature that he strives after this absence of dependence, this removal of 
diversity in theory as well as in practice. The greatest good for 
Epicurus is ataraxia [ataraxy] since the spirit, which is the thing in 
question, is empirically unique. Plutarch revels in commonplaces, he 
argues like an apprentice.

Incidentally we can speak of the conception of the *sofos*, [wise man] 
who is a preoccupation equally of the Epicurean, Stoic and Sceptic 
philosophies. If we study him we shall find that he belongs most 
logically to the atomistic philosophy of Epicurus and that, viewed from 
this standpoint too, the downfall of ancient philosophy is presented in 
complete objectiveness in Epicurus.

Ancient philosophy seeks to comprehend the wise man, *o sofos*, in two 
ways, but both of them have the same root.

What appears theoretically in the account given of matter, appears 
practically in the definition of the *sofos*. Greek philosophy begins 
with seven wise men, among whom is the Ionian philosopher of nature 
Thales, and it ends with the attempt to portray the wise man 
conceptually. The beginning and the end, but no less the centre, the 
middle, is one *sofos*, namely Socrates. It is no more an accident that 
philosophy gravitates round these substantial individuals, than that the 
political downfall of Greece takes place at the time when Alexander 
loses his wisdom in Babylon.

Since the soul of Greek life and the Greek mind is substance, which 
first appears in them as free substance, the knowledge of this substance 
occurs in independent beings, individuals, who, being notable, on the 
one hand, each has his being in external contrast to the others, and 
whose knowledge, on the other hand, is the inward life of substance and 
thus something internal to the conditions of the reality surrounding 
them. The Greek philosopher is a demiurge, his world is a different one 
from that which flowers in the natural sun of the substantial.

The first wise men are only the vessels, the Pythia, from which the 
substance resounds in general, simple precepts; their language is as yet 
only that of the substance become vocal, the simple forces of moral life 
which are revealed. Hence they are in part also active leaders in 
political life, lawgivers.

The Ionian philosophers of nature are just as much isolated phenomena as 
the forms of the natural element appear under which they seek to 
apprehend the universe. The Pythagoreans organise an inner life for 
themselves within the state; the form in which they realise their 
knowledge of substance is halfway between a completely conscious 
isolation not observed among the Ionians, whose isolation is rather the 
undeliberate, naive isolation of elementary existences, and the trustful 
carrying on of life within a moral order. The form of their life is 
itself substantial, political, but maintained abstract, reduced to a 
minimum in extent and natural fundamentals, just as their principle, 
number, stands midway between colourful sensuousness and the ideal. The 
Eleatics, as the first discoverers of the ideal forms of substance, who 
themselves still apprehend the inwardness of substance in a purely 
internal and abstract, intensive manner, are the passionately 
enthusiastic prophetic heralds of the breaking dawn. Bathed in simple 
light, they turn away indignantly from the people and from the gods of 
antiquity. But in the case of Anaxagoras the people themselves turn to 
the gods of antiquity in opposition to the isolated wise man and declare 
him to be such, expelling him from their midst. In modem times (cf., for 
example, Ritter, Geschichte der alien Philosophie, Bd. I [1829, pp. 300 
ff.]) Anaxagoras has been accused of dualism. Aristotle says in the 
first book of the Metaphysics that he uses the nous [reason] like a 
machine and only resorts to it when he runs out of natural explanations. 
But this apparent dualism is on the one hand that very same dualistic 
element which begins to split the heart of the state in the time of 
Anaxagoras, and on the other hand it must be understood more profoundly. 
The nous is active and is resorted to where there is no natural 
determination. It is itself the non ens [Not-being] of the natural, the 
ideality. And then the activity of this ideality intervenes only when 
physical sight fails the philosopher, that is, the nous is the 
philosopher's own nous, and is resorted to when he is no longer able to 
objectify his activity. Thus the subjective nous appeared as the essence 
of the wandering scholar [c.f. Goethe] and, in its power as ideality of 
real determination, it appears on the one hand in the Sophists and on 
the other in Socrates.

If the first Greek wise men are the real spirit, the embodied knowledge 
of substance, if their utterances preserve just as much genuine 
intensity as substance itself, if, as substance is increasingly 
idealised, the bearers of its progress assert an ideal life in their 
particular reality in opposition to the reality of manifested substance, 
of the real life of the people, then the ideality itself is only in the 
form of substance. There is no undermining of the living powers; the 
most ideal men of this period, the Pythagoreans and the Eleatics, extol 
state life as real reason; their principles are objective, a power which 
is superior to themselves, which they herald in a semi-mystical fashion, 
in poetic enthusiasm; that is, in a form which raises natural energy to 
ideality and does not consume it, but processes it and leaves it intact 
in the determination of the natural. This embodiment of the ideal 
substance occurs in the philosophers themselves who herald it., not only 
is its expression plastically poetic, its reality is this person, whose 
reality is its own appearance; they themselves are living images, living 
works of art which the people sees rising out of itself in plastic 
greatness; while their activity, as in the case of the first wise men, 
shapes the universal, their utterances are the really assertive 
substance, the laws.

Hence these wise men are just as little like ordinary people as the 
statues of the Olympic gods; the motion is rest in self, their relation 
to the people is the same objectivity as their relation to substance. 
The oracles of the Delphic Apollo were divine truth for the people, 
veiled in the chiaroscuro of an unknown power, only as long as the 
genuine evident power of the Greek spirit sounded from the Pythian 
tripod; the people had a theoretical attitude towards them only as long 
as they were the resounding theory of the people itself, they were of 
the people only as long as they were unlike them. The same with these 
wise men. But with the Sophists and Socrates, and by virtue of dunamis 
[potentialities] in Anaxagoras, the situation was reversed. Now it is 
ideality itself which, in its immediate form, the subjective spirit, 
becomes the principle of philosophy. In the earlier Greek wise men there 
was revealed the ideal form of the substance, its identity, in 
distinction to the many-coloured raiment woven from the individualities 
of various peoples that displayed its manifest reality. Consequently, 
these wise men on the one hand apprehend the absolute only in the most 
one-sided, most general ontological definitions, and on the other hand, 
themselves represent in reality the appearance of the substance enclosed 
in itself. While they hold themselves aloof from the pollai, [multitude] 
and express the mystery of the spirit, on the other hand, like the 
plastic gods in the market places, in their blissful self-contemplation, 
they are the genuine embellishment of the people, to which as 
individuals they return. It is now, on the contrary, ideality itself, 
pure abstraction which has come to be for itself, that faces the 
substance; subjectivity, which establishes itself as the principle of 
philosophy. Not of the people, this subjectivity, confronting the 
substantial powers of the people, is yet of the people, that is, it 
confronts reality externally, is in practice entangled in it, and its 
existence is motion. These mobile vessels of development are the 
Sophists. Their innermost form, cleansed from the immediate dross of 
appearance, is Socrates, whom the Delphic oracle called the *sofwtaton*. 
[wisest]

Being confronted by its own ideality, substance is split up into a mass 
of accidental limited existences and institutions whose right — unity, 
and identity with it — has escaped into the subjective spirit. The 
subjective spirit itself is as such the vessel of substance, but because 
this ideality is opposed to reality, it is present in minds objectively 
as a "must"; and subjectively as a striving. The expression-of this 
subjective spirit, which knows that it has the ideality in itself, is 
the judgment of the concept, for which the criterion of the individual 
is that which is determined in itself, the purpose, the good, but which 
is still here a "must" of reality. This "must" of reality is likewise a 
"must" of the subject which has become conscious of this ideality, for 
it itself stands rooted in reality and the reality outside it is its 
own. Thus the position of this subject is just as much determined as its 
fate.

First, the fact that this ideality of substance has entered the 
subjective spirit, has fallen away from itself, is a leap, a falling 
away from the substantial life determined in the substantial life 
itself. Hence this determination of the subject is for it an 
accomplished fact, an alien force, the bearer of which it finds itself 
to be, the daemon of Socrates. The daemon is the immediate appearance of 
the fact that for Greek life philosophy is just as much only internal as 
only external. The characteristics of the daemon determine the empirical 
singularity of the subject, because the subject naturally detaches 
itself from the substantial, and hence naturally determined, life in 
this [Greek] life, since the daemon appears as a natural determinant. 
The Sophists themselves are these daemons, not yet differentiated from 
their actions. Socrates is conscious that he carries the daemon in 
himself. Socrates is the substantial exemplar of substance losing itself 
in the subject. He is therefore just as much a substantial individual as 
the earlier philosophers, but after the manner of subjectivity, not 
enclosed in himself, not an image of the gods, but a human one, pot 
mysterious, but clear and luminous, not a seer, but :a sociable man.

The second determination is therefore that this subject pronounces a 
judgment on the "must"; the purpose. Substance has lost its ideality in 
the subjective spirit, which thus has become in itself the determination 
of substance, its predicate, while substance itself has become in 
relation to the subjective spirit only the immediate, unjustified, 
merely existing composite of independent existences. The determination 
of the predicate, since it refers to something existing, is hence itself 
immediate, and since this something is the living spirit of the people, 
it is in practice the determination of the individual spirits, education 
and teaching. The "must" of substantiality is the subjective spirit's 
own determination expressed by it; the purpose of the world is therefore 
its [the spirit's] own purpose, to teach about it is its calling. It 
therefore embodies in itself the purpose and hence the good both in its 
life and in its teaching. It is the wise man as he has entered into 
practical motion.

Finally, inasmuch as this individual pronounces the judgment of the 
concept on the world, he is in himself divided and judged; for while he 
has his roots for one part in the substantial, he owes his right to 
exist only to the laws of the state to which he belongs, to its 
religion, in brief, to all the substantial conditions which appear to 
him as his own nature. On the other hand, he possesses in himself the 
purpose which is the judge of that substantiality. His own 
substantiality is therefore judged in this individual himself and thus 
he perishes precisely because he is born of the substantial, and not of 
the free spirit which endures and overcomes all contradictions and which 
need not recognise any natural conditions as such.

The reason why Socrates is so important is that the relation of Greek 
philosophy to the Greek spirit, and therefore its inner limit, is 
expressed in him. It is self-evident how stupid was the comparison drawn 
in recent times between the relation of Hegelian philosophy to life and 
the case of Socrates, from which the justification for condemning the 
Hegelian philosophy was deduced. The specific failing of Greek 
philosophy is precisely that it stands related only to the substantial 
spirit; in our time both sides are spirit and both want to be 
acknowledged as such.

Subjectivity is manifested in its immediate bearer [Socrates] as his 
life and his practical activity, as a form by which he leads single 
individuals out of the determinations of substantiality to determination 
in themselves; apart from this practical activity, his philosophy has no 
other content than the abstract determination of the good. His 
philosophy is his transference from substantially existing notions, 
differences, etc., to determination-in-self, which, however, has no 
other content than to be the vessel of this dissolving reflection; his 
philosophy is therefore essentially his own wisdom, his own goodness; in 
relation to the world the only fulfilment of his teaching on the good is 
a quite different subjectivity from that of Kant when he establishes his 
categorical imperative. For Kant it is of no account what attitude he, 
as an empirical subject, adopts towards this imperative.

With Plato motion becomes ideal; as Socrates is the image and teacher of 
the world, so Plato's ideas, his philosophical abstraction, are its 
prototypes.

In Plato this abstract determination of the good, of the purpose, 
develops into a comprehensive, world-embracing philosophy. The purpose, 
as the determination in itself, the real will of the philosopher, is 
thinking, the real determinations of this good are the immanent 
thoughts. The real will of the philosopher, the ideality active in him, 
is the real "must" of the real world. Plato sees this his attitude to 
reality in such a way that an independent realm of ideas hovers over 
reality (and this "beyond" is the philosopher's own subjectivity) and is 
obscurely reflected in it. If Socrates discovered only the name of the 
ideality which has passed out of substance into the subject, and was 
himself consciously this motion, the substantial world of reality now 
enters really idealised into Plato's consciousness, but thereby this 
ideal world itself is just as simply organised in itself as is the 
really substantial world facing it of which Aristotle most aptly remarked:

(Metaphysics, I, Chap. IX) "For the Forms are practically equal to -- or 
not fewer than -- the things, in trying to explain which these thinkers 
proceeded from them to the Form".

The determination of this world and its organisation in itself is 
therefore to the philosopher himself a beyond, the motion has been 
removed from this world.

"Yet when the Forms exist, still the things that share in them do not 
come into being, unless there is something to originate movement [... 
]." Aristotle, op. cit.

The philosopher as such, that is, as the wise man, not as the motion of 
the real spirit in general, is therefore the truth-beyond of the 
substantial world facing him. Plato expresses this most precisely when 
he says that either the philosophers must become kings or the kings 
philosophers for the state to achieve its purpose. In his attempts to 
educate a tyrant he also made a practical effort on these lines. His 
state has indeed as its special and highest estate that of the learned. 
[Plato, Res publica, V, 473.]

I wish to mention here two other remarks made by Aristotle, because they 
provide the most important conclusions concerning the form of Platonic 
consciousness and link up with the aspect from which we consider it in 
relation to the *sofos*.

Aristotle says of Plato:

"In the Phaedo the case is stated in this way -- that the Forms are 
causes both of being and of becoming; yet when the Forms exist, still 
the things that share in them do not come into being, unless there is 
something to originate movement ]." Aristotle, op. cit.

It is not only that which is, it is the whole possibility of being that 
Plato wants to bring out into ideality: this ideality is a closed, 
specifically different realm in the philosophising consciousness itself: 
because it is this, it lacks motion.

This contradiction in the philosophising consciousness must objectify 
itself to the latter, the philosophising consciousness must eject this 
contradiction.

"Again the Forms are patterns not only of sensible things, but of Forms 
themselves also: e.g. the genus, as genus of Forms; so that the same 
thing could be both pattern and copy." [op. cit.]

Lucretius on the ancient Ionian philosophers:

"... have certainly made many excellent and divine discoveries and 
uttered oracles from the inner sanctuary of their hearts with more 
sanctity and far surer reason than those the Delphic prophetess 
pronounces, drugged by the laurel fumes from Apollo's tripod." Book I, 
11. 736-740.

Important for the definition of the Epicurean philosophy of nature is 
the following:

1. The eternity of matter, which is connected with the fact that time is 
considered as an accident of accidents, as proper only to composites and 
their eventis, and hence is relegated to outside the material principle, 
outside the atom itself. It is further connected with the fact that the 
substance of the Epicurean philosophy is that which reflects only 
externally, which has no premises, which is arbitrariness and accident. 
Time is rather the fate of nature, of the finite. Negative unity with 
itself, its internal necessity.

2. The void, the negation, is not the negative of matter itself, but 
[space] where there is no matter. In this respect too, therefore, matter 
is in itself eternal.

The form which we see emerge at the conclusion from the workshop of 
Greek philosophical consciousness, out of the darkness of abstraction, 
and veiled in its dark garb, is the same form in which Greek philosophy 
walked, alive, the stage of the world, the same form which saw gods even 
in the burning hearth, the same which drank the poison cup, the same 
which, as the God of Aristotle, enjoys the greatest bliss, theory.

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1839/notebook/ch02.htm


06/02/07 18:20 GERALD ALI wrote:

> ' Irish sept ', for those who don't know it, a sept is a clan.
> 
> Which is why the Irish are known as the 'September people'.  Is that true ?
> 
> All extracts from the same book ----------
> First published: in 1877, by MacMillan & Company, London. This edition was printed in USA; This Edition is reproduced from the "First Indian Edition (1944), published by BHARTI LIBRARY, Booksellers & Publishers, 145, Cornwallis Street, Calcutta. 
> Composed by Tariq Sharif, [more recently for publication on the internet] "WATERMARK", Gujranwala, Pakistan.
> First Indian Edition (1944),    
> Quote ---   '''   In further course of time a third great system of consanguinity [blood relationships] came in, which may be called, at pleasure, the Aryan, Semitic, or Uralian, and probably superseded a prior Turanian system among the principal nations, who afterwards attained civilization. It is the system which defines the relationships in the monogamian 
> 
> 
> No new system of consanguinity was created by the Hebrew patriarchal family. The Turanian system would harmonize with a part of its relationships; but as this form of the family soon fell out, and the monogamian became general, it was followed by the Semitic system of consanguinity, as the Grecian and Roman were by the Aryan. Each of the three great systems - the Malayan, the Turanian, and the Aryan - indicates a completed organic movement of society, and each assured the presence, with unerring certainty, of that form of the family whose relationships it recorded. 
> ---------------------------------------------------------
> The Celtic branch of the Aryan family retained, in the Scottish clan and Irish sept, the organization into gentes to a later period of time than any other branch of the family, unless the Aryans of India are an exception. The Scottish clan in particular was existing in remarkable vitality in the Highlands of Scotland in the middle of the last century [1700's]. It was an excellent type of the gens in organization and in spirit, and an extraordinary illustration of the power of the gentile life over its members. The illustrious author of Waverley has perpetuated a number of striking characters developed under clan life, and stamped with its peculiarities. Evan Dhu, Torquil, Rob Roy and many others rise before the mind as illustrations of the influence of the gens in moulding the character of individuals. If Sir Walter exaggerated these characters in some respects to suit the emergencies of a tale, they had a real foundation. The same clans, a few centuries earlier, when clan 
life was stronger and external influences were weaker, would probably have verified the pictures. We find in their feuds and blood revenge, in their localization by gentes, in their use of lands in common, in the fidelity of the clansman to his chief and of the members of the clan to each other, the usual and persistent features of gentile society. As portrayed by Scott, it was a more intense and chivalrous gentile life than we are able to find in the gentes of the Greeks and Romans, or, at the other extreme, in those of the American aborigines. Whether the phratric organization existed among them does not appear, but at some anterior period both the phratry and the tribe doubtless did exist. It is well known that the British government were compelled to break up the Highland clans, as organizations, in order to bring the people under the authority of law and the usages of political society. Descent was in the male line, the children of the males remaining members of the clan
, while the children of its female members belonged to the clans of their respective fathers.
> ----------------------------------
> I. The Consanguine Family. 
> It was founded upon the intermarriage of brothers and sisters in a group. Evidence still remains in the oldest of existing systems of Consanguinity, the Malayan, tending to show that this, the first form of the family, was anciently as universal as this system of consanguinity which it created 
> 
> II. The Punaluan Family. 
> Its name is derived from the Hawaiian relationship of Punalua. It was founded upon the intermarriage of several brothers to each other's wives in a group; and of several sisters to each other's husbands in a group. But the term brother, as here used, included the first, second, third, and even more remote male cousins, all of whom were considered brothers to each other, as we consider own brothers; and the term sister included the first, second, third, and even more remote female cousins, all of whom were sisters to each other, the same as own sisters. This form of the family supervened upon the consanguine. It created the Turanian and Ganowanian systems of consanguinity. Both this and the previous form belong to the period of savagery.
> 
> III. The Syndyasmian Family.
> The term is from syndyazo, to pair, syndyasmos, a joining two together. It was founded upon the pairing of a male with a female under the form of marriage, but without an exclusive cohabitation. It was the germ of the Monogamian Family. Divorce or separation was at the option of both husband and wife. This form of the family failed to create a system of consanguinity.
> 
> IV. The Patriarchal Family.
> It was founded upon the marriage of one man to several wives. The term is here used in a restricted sense to define the special family of the Hebrew pastoral tribes, the chiefs and principal men of which practised polygamy. It exercised but little influence upon human affairs for want of universality.
> 
> V. The Monogamian Family
> It was founded upon the marriage of one man with one woman, with an exclusive cohabitation; the latter constituting the essential of the institution. It is pre-eminently the family of civilized society, and was therefore essentially modern. This form of the family also created an independent system of consanguinity.
> 
> Evidence will elsewhere be produced tending to show both the existence and the general prevalence of these several forms of the family at different stages of human progress..
> 
> ------------------------------------------
> 
> Such a remarkable record of the condition of ancient society would not have been preserved to the present time but for the singular permanence of systems of consanguinity. The Aryan system, for example, has stood near three thousand years without radical change, and would endure a hundred thousand years in the future, provided the monogamian family, whose relationships it defines, should so long remain. It describes the relationships which actually exist under monogamy, and is therefore incapable of change, so long as the family remains as at present constituted. 1f a new form of the family should appear among Aryan nations, it would not affect the present system of consanguinity until after it became universal; and while in that case it, might modify the system in some particulars, it would not overthrow it; unless the new family were radically different from the monogamian. It was precisely the same with its immediate predecessor, the Turanian system, and before that with
 the Malayan, the predecessor of the Turanian in the order of derivative growth. An antiquity of unknown duration may be assigned to the Malayan system which came in with the consanguine family, remained for an indefinite period after the punaluan family appeared, and seems to have been displaced in other tribes by the Turanian, with the establishment of the organization into gentes. 
> 
> ----------------------------------------
> 
> These systems resolve themselves into two ultimate farms, fundamentally distinct. One of these is classificatory, and the other descriptive. Under the first, consanguinei are never described, but are classified into categories, irrespective of their nearness or remoteness in degree to Ego; and the same term of relationship is applied to all the persons in the same category. Thus my own brothers, and the sons of my father's brothers are all alike my brothers; my own sisters, and the daughters of my mother's sisters are all alike my sisters; such is the classification under both the Malayan and Turanian systems. In the second case consanguinei are described either by the primary terms of relationship or a combination of these terms, thus making the relationship of each person specific. Thus we say brother's son, father's brother, and father's brother's son. Such was the system of the Aryan, Semitic, and Uralian families, which came in with monogamy. A small amount of classifi
cation was subsequently introduced by the invention of common terms; but the earliest form of the system, of which the Erse and Scandinavian are typical, was purely descriptive, as illustrated by the above examples. The radical difference between the two systems resulted from plural marriages in the group in one case, and from single marriages between single pairs in the other.
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------
> 
> There was another feature of the relation which shows that the American aborigines in the Lower Status of barbarism [anthropological terms used, author a member of a clan] had not attained the moral development implied by monogamy. Among the Iroquois, who were barbarians of high mental grade, and among the usually advanced Indian tribes generally, chastity had come to be required of the wife under sever penalties which the husband might inflict; but he did not admit the reciprocal obligation. The one cannot be permanently realized without the other. Moreover, polygamy was universally recognized as the right of the males, although the practice was limited from inability to support the indulgence. 
> 
> -----------------------------
> 
> XVI. The Aryan, Semitic and Uralian system of consanguinity, which are essentially identical, were created by the monogamian family. Its relationships are those which actually existed under this form of marriage and of the family. A system of consanguinity is not an arbitrary enactment, but a natural growth. It expresses, and must of necessity express, the actual facts of consanguinity as they appeared to the common mind when the system was formed. As the Aryan system establishes the antecedent existence of a monogamian family, so the Turanian establishes the antecedent existence of a punaluan family, and the Malayan the antecedent existence of a consanguine family. The evidence they contain must be regarded as conclusive, because of its convincing character in each case. With the existence established of three kinds of marriage, of three forms of the family, and of three systems of consanguinity, nine of the sixteen members of the sequence are sustained. The existence and 
relations of the remainder are warranted by sufficient proof. 
> 
> -----------------------------------